Exploring the Impact of a Federation on Cyprus’ EU Status

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The ongoing debate between Greek and Turkish Cypriots centers on two contrasting visions: whether Cyprus should evolve into a unified federation or consist of two independent states. The Greek Cypriots advocate for a single, unified state that could transition into a federation, while others, primarily on the Turkish Cypriot side, argue for the creation of two independent, sovereign states that could potentially form a federation.

These two doctrines have long shaped the discourse surrounding the Cyprus issue. They underpin the strategies and actions that have kept the possibilities of resolution in a state of deadlock, engaging the nation’s resources and attention for decades. The various aspects of state flexibility, power distribution, and governance structures are tools that both sides use to reconcile these differing doctrines. This allows political leaders and foreign policy makers in both Turkey and Greece to maneuver towards their respective goals.

For many years, the Cyprus issue has been mired in what can be described as “constructive ambiguities.” These ambiguities are not only present between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities but also within each community itself.

From the perspective of Greek Cypriots, a federation promises the unity of the state, along with the freedoms of movement and residence—freedoms that are often referred to in the context of “liberation” and “ending the occupation.” However, this concept also acknowledges the existence of two distinct societies, each maintaining its own separate state structures. This dual reality is something that many Greek Cypriots, particularly those who lived through the civil unrest of the 1960s and the 1974 invasion, may desire but are reluctant to openly admit.

On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots view a federation as a means to secure the autonomy they have sought since the events leading up to the 1970s. At the same time, it allows them to participate in a structured state within the European Union—an arrangement that keeps them connected to Turkey, yet distinct. Turkey is seen as both an occupying force and a sister nation—familiar yet better kept at arm’s length.

If Ersin Tatar, the current leader of the Turkish Cypriots, is pressured to moderate his stance, as his predecessor Dervis Eroglu was, the Turkish side may be forced to present the “two-state solution” in a more flexible manner to avoid being cornered. Despite how the Greek Cypriot leadership portrays it, the Turkish side is not omnipotent nor excessively Machiavellian. While they may have strategic foresight, their actions are also driven by immediate political needs and circumstances.

The “two-state solution” often discussed by Turkish Cypriots does not necessarily entail the establishment of a fully independent “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) recognized as the 194th UN member state or the 28th EU member state. Other possibilities exist, such as the evolution of a Turkish Cypriot state that is recognized by some but not all, with Northern Cyprus potentially becoming a military base for Turkey and a center for corruption within the Turkish state apparatus.

Another scenario could involve a confederation, where both states retain some degree of sovereignty, framed as a “two-state solution” within the context of the EU. This could resemble a loose federation of two states within the EU, even though the EU currently only recognizes one state.

These interpretations reflect the nuances in the positions of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, as well as the gray areas that exist within and between them. Our approach to these issues should be grounded in logic and data rather than wishful thinking. However, we must remain flexible in our interpretations to avoid complacency and ensure we are not caught off guard by Turkish intransigence.

If there is any opportunity to return to discussions about a federation, it should be seized and approached with a pragmatic mindset. While every proposed plan may seem worse than the last, this is not an absolute truth. Serious and intensive efforts, as seen during the Christofias-Talat and Anastasiades-Akinci negotiations, can lead to meaningful improvements.

A key improvement now would be to ensure that the process involves full, continuous, and transparent communication with the public, allowing citizens to provide feedback and be actively engaged. The Greek Cypriot leadership should consider the ideas, suggestions, and objections from the public on substantive issues, rather than simply relying on polls about government popularity. Additionally, mechanisms should be established to allow for evolutionary momentum, enabling citizens to express their preference for either a looser or a stronger central state through their vote.

Source: George Kakouris, knews.kathimerini.com.cy

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